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GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 IO-12 OIC-04 AEC-11

ACDA-19 OMB-01 RSR-01 /155 W
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R 171505 Z APR 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9766

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2877

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1899

HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT

VIENNA FOR US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS 12/31/79

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SUBJ: CSCE: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

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BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS MISSION' S VIEWS, AS
REQUESTED, ON ISSUES INVOLVED IN CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE
(CBM) CONCERNING PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS AND ON
POSSIBLE FORMATS FOR INCLUSION OF CBMS IN CSCE AGREEMENTS.
END SUMMARY.

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1. BY REFTTEL A, WASHINGTON SOLICITED MISSION' S VIEWS ON ISSUES
INVOLVED IN THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE (CBM) CONCERNING

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS, AS OPPOSED TO MANEUVERS.

2. OUR COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF FOUR DISSIMILAR DESIDERATA:

- A. THE NEED TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH NATO'S DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS;
- B. THE GOAL OF CBMS TO CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY AND ENHANCE CONFIDENCE;
- C. THE NEED TO AVOID LINKAGE WITH MBFR;
- D. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE MEASURE AND ITS CRITERIA TO THE WARSAW PACT.

3. OUR COMMENTS ON THE ISSUES THEMSELVES ARE DIVIDED INTO FOUR AREAS:

- A. SIZE OF THE MOVEMENTS TO BE NOTIFIED; B. TIMING OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION; C. TYPES OF FORCES MOVED; D. AREA OF APPLICABILITY.

4. AS GENERAL COMMENT, WE CONCUR WITH IS DRAFT (REFTEL B) THAT THE FORMULATION OF PRECISE DEFINITIONS WITH QUANTITATIVE OR QUALITATIVE CRITERIA FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT. MOREOVER, PRECISE DEFINITIONS IN OUR VIEW COULD IMPINGE UPON NATO'S MILITARY FLEXIBILITY AND WOULD LIKELY MAKE THE MEASURE LESS ACCEPTABLE TO THE WARSAW PACT. ACCORDINGLY, WE SUPPORT THE IDEA IN PARA 8, REFTEL B, THAT THE DEFINITION OF " MAJOR" WITH REGARD TO MOVEMENTS DEPENDS UPON A NUMBER OF FACTORS: TYPE, LOCATION, MAGNITUDE, DIRECTION, EXISTING POLITICAL SITUATION, ETC.

5. SIZE OF THE MOVEMENTS TO BE NOTIFIED. WE BELIEVE THE MAGNITUDE OF A MOVEMENT SHOULD NOT BE THE ONLY CRITERION IN THE CASE OF CBMS. EQUALLY GERMANE ARE THE CRITERIA WE SUGGESTED TO WASHINGTON IN PARA 5 OF REFTEL C, WHICH ARE READILY MODIFIED TO PERTAIN TO MOVEMENTS AND ARE MORE PERTINENT AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PARA 2 (ABOVE): AS MODIFIED, THESE CRITERIA WOULD BE:

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- A. PROXIMITY OF MOVEMENT TO OTHER'S TERRITORY
- B. TYPE OF MOVEMENT AND WHETHER IT COULD BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE, THREATENING OR DESTABILIZING
- C. WHETHER THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS WAS INVOLVED.

6. TIMING OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. WE MAINTAIN THAT NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE BY ANNUAL CALENDARS BUT SUGGEST THAT MOVEMENTS NOT BE FURTHER DEFINED IN TIME IN THE CALENDAR THAN THE MONTHS IN WHICH THEY ARE ANTICIPATED. FURTHER REFINEMENT IN ANNUAL CALENDARS

WOULD APPEAR UNNECESSARILY INFLEXIBLE. AS A LATER SUPPLEMENT, AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME PRIOR TO THE INTENDED MOVEMENT, SPECIFIC DATES COULD BE PROVIDED. WITH REGARD TO UNFORESEEN MOVEMENTS, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD BE NOTIFIED WITHIN A "REASONABLE" TIME IN ADVANCE.

7. TYPES OF FORCES TO BE MOVED. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL TYPES OF FORCES (LAND, SEA, AND AIR) SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. (SEE REFTTEL C.) HOWEVER, SINCE THE WARSAW PACT'S ARMOR/ MECHANIZED CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS PERCEIVED BY THE MAJORITY OF ALLIES AS BEING MORE THREATENING THAN OTHER WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES, WE RECOMMEND EMPHASIS ON ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES' MOVEMENTS.

8. WASHINGTON SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO SOVIET QUERY IN MPT (HELSINKI 768) AS TO WHETHER US WOULD BE WILLING TO NOTIFY ROUTINE ROTATIONS. IN OUR VIEW, US SHOULD ARGUE IN CSCE AS ALLIED REPS HAVE DONE IN MPT THAT PROPOSAL SHOULD ENCOMPASS ALL " MAJOR" MOVEMENTS, WHATEVER THEIR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OR DESIGNATION. THIS APPROACH WOULD EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDE MOST US TROOP ROTATIONS, WHICH TAKE PLACE ON A MORE OR LESS CONTINUOUS BASIS IN SMALL INCREMENTS, BUT INCLUDE MOST SOVIET TROOP ROTATIONS WHICH ARE USUALLY LARGE- SCALE, SEMI- ANNUAL ACTIVITIES. IT WOULD ALSO AVOID SITUATION IN WHICH SOVIETS COULD EVADE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT SIMPLY BY IDENTIFYING A LARGE- SCALE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AS A " ROTATION."

9. AREA OF APPLICABILITY. WE BELIEVE THAT CSCE SHOULD AVOID DEFINING PRECISE AREAS OF APPLICATION FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. SUCH AS APPROACH WOULD RESULT IN A COMPLEX EXERCISE IN POLITICAL CARTOGRAPHY, LEADING TO THOSE VERY TECHNICAL

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AND PROTRACTED DISCUSSIONS WHICH WE WISH MOST TO AVOID. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CONFERENCE WILL NEED TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF AREA IN SOME WAY.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 1899

10. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE CONFERENCE DESIGNATE " SPECIFIED AREAS." IN MPT DISCUSSION, THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT THIS INTEREST IS PRINCIPALLY A REFLECTION OF THEIR DESIRE TO AVOID NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS DEEP IN SOVIET TERRITORY (E. G., IN TRANS- VOLGAN STEPPES) AND OF ROUTINE TROOP ROTATIONS AND REPLACEMENTS. THEY MAY ALSO BE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING TO NOTIFY FORCE MOVEMENTS TOWARDS THE EAST. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ALLIES ARE INTERESTED IN REQUIRING SOVIETS TO NOTIFY THE TYPES OF MAJOR FORCE MOVEMENTS WHICH THEY HAVE EMPLOYED IN THE PAST TO PRESSURE OR INVADE OTHER EUROPEAN STATES.

11. THE ANSWER TO THIS PROBLEM MAY LIE IN FINDING A FORMULATION IN CSCE WHICH IS GENERAL ENOUGH TO AVOID MAP- DRAWING, BUT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING POLITICAL THRUST AND PURPOSE OF PROPOSAL. WASHINGTON MAY THUS WISH TO CONSIDER USDEL MPT' S INQUIRY (HELSINKI 917) AS TO WHETHER US WOULD CONSIDER QUALIFYING MAJOR " MOVEMENTS" CONFIDENTIAL

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FOR CBM PURPOSES AS THOSE MAJOR MOVEMENTS WHICH TAKE PLACE " NEAR OR ACROSS NATIONAL FRONTIERS" OF OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS QUALIFICATION WOULD RESPOND TO OSTENSIBLE SOVIET ARGUMENT AGAINST NOTIFYING MOVEMENTS DEEP WITHIN SOVIET INTERIOR, WHILE MAKING POLITICAL INTENT OF THIS CBM EVEN CLEARER. TO MAKE CLEAR THAT MEASURE WOULD APPLY AS WELL TO COASTAL AREAS AS TO " FRONTIERS" (I. E., TO HELP MEET NORWEGIAN CONCERNS), FORMULATION ON AREA MIGHT BE WORDED MORE PRECISELY AS FOLLOWS: " MAJOR MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS WHICH TAKE PLACE NEAR THE TERRITORY OR ACROSS THE NATIONAL FRONTIERS OF OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES".

12. WE RECOMMEND THAT PRIOR TO TAKING A POSITION ON ANY CRITERIA FOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS AND IN DEVELOPING AN

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF MOVEMENTS FOR USE IN SECOND STAGE OF CSCE, WASHINGTON UNDERTAKE A CAREFUL MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THEIR IMPACT ON NATO'S DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE RECOMMEND WASHINGTON SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE IN ITS ASSESSMENT, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE USG WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR U. S. MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

13. THIS PORTION OF MESSAGE CONTAINS OUR VIEWS ON THE DESIDERATA FOR CBMS THEMSELVES AND THE FORMAT FOR THEIR INCLUSION IN CSCE. ANY PRODUCTS PROVIDED BY WASHINGTON SHOULD SERVE AT LEAST FURTHER TO CLARIFY THINKING AMONG THE ALLIES, PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND AND, AS NEEDED, NEGOTIATING MATERIAL FOR THE CSCE'S SECOND STAGE. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT AS WELL-- BECAUSE BOTH US AND NATO FORCES AND SECURITY ARE INVOLVED-- TO HAVE THESE STUDIES PROCEED IN NATO, AND NOT IN THE EC-9.

14. IN OUR VIEW, ADDITIONAL WORK ON CBMS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH APPRECIATION THAT CBMS EVENTUALLY NEGOTIATED SHOULD BE:

- A. NON- BINDING, IN A LEGAL SENSE;
- B. GENERAL ENOUGH IN THEIR PROVISIONS TO ALLOW FOR FLEXIBILITY IN IMPLEMENTATION;
- C. DESIGNED TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO PAY A POLITICAL PRICE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY.

15. TO ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES, FORMAT IS OF PARTICULAR CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPORTANCE. THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS OCCUR TO US:

- A. INCLUDING CBMS AS PART OF THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE RELATIONS. THEY WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS STEPS TO ASSURE OTHERS, THAT, THROUGH MILITARY MOVEMENTS, PARTICIPATING STATES HAD NO INTENTION TO " THREATEN OR USE FORCE."
- B. INCLUDING CBMS AS AN ANNEX TO THE DECLARATION, WITHOUT TYING IT SPECIFICALLY TO ANY ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES.
- C. CONCLUDING A SEPARATE DECLARATION INCLUDING CBMS.

16. THE CHOICE OF OPTION WILL DEPEND IN PART ON THE:

- A. DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY AND DETAIL DESIRED;
- B. THE EMPHASIS TO BE ASSIGNED CBMS IN OVERALL CONTEXT OF CSCE;
- C. THE BALANCE OF INTEREST AS BETWEEN VARIOUS CSCE ISSUES.

17. INCLUDING CBMS IN A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WOULD TEND TO ENCOURAGE BRIEF AND NON- SPECIFIC CBMS; IT WOULD ENHANCE IMPORTANCE OF DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND PERHAPS LEAD TO CLAIM THAT CBMS ARE LEGALLY BINDING. IN CONTRAST, A SEPARATE CBM DECLARATION WOULD TEND TO ENCOURAGE ADDITIONAL,

AND MORE ELABORATE EXPRESSION OF CBMS; BUT IF THERE IS DIFFICULTY IN NEGOTIATION OF A SEPARATE CBM DECLARATION, OR POSSIBLE DEFERRAL, IT WOULD NOT HOLD UP AGREEMENT ON OTHER MATTERS SUCH AS A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. CBMS AS AN ANNEX TO A DECLARATION OFFERS POSSIBLY GREATER FLEXIBILITY AS FAR AS PARTICIPATION; PRESUMABLY AN ANNEX COULD BE DRAFTED SO THAT ONLY INTERESTED COUNTRIES SUBSCRIBE. WASHINGTON SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT DURING MPT DISCUSSIONS THUS FAR, MOST COUNTRIES, EXCEPT US, FRANCE AND, TO A SOMEWHAT LESSER DEGREE, USSR, FAVOR A MANDATE ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY OF WHICH CBMS WOULD FORM ONLY ONE ELEMENT (HELSINKI 917), I. E., ALONG LINES OF OPTION IN PARA 15 C ABOVE. (OTHER ELEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION IN MPT INCLUDES GENERAL PREMISE, OBJECTIVE, COOPERATION IN DISARMAMENT, RIGHT TO RAISE ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS, ETC.) RUMSFELD

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